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Abstract
Widespread concern about earnings management, the management of
financial information to mislead investors, was one of the key factors leading to
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). In this study, I investigate
whether SOX is effective in limiting earnings management. Earnings management
is a concern because misrepresentation of a company’s financial position and the
results of its performance can mislead investors into making poor investment
decisions. This study examines earnings changes before and after the passage of
SOX to see whether small positive earnings changes were less likely in the postSOX period, supporting the effectiveness of SOX in constraining earnings
management. This study did not find significant improvements in the quality of
financial reporting after the passage of SOX. This lack of significant results could
reflect the limits of the sample and the data analysis. It is also possible that
earnings management was already being constrained prior to the Act, due to new
auditing standards and media attention, or that earnings management was not as
widespread as the media made it appear to be during the Enron and WorldCom
scandals.
Keywords: earnings management, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), business ethics, financial reporting

Author’s note: The following is a revised and updated version of a paper Troy Lee wrote based on a 20072008 academic year study of earnings management. In that study, Lee found that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did
reduce earnings management. He looked at earnings changes between 1998 and 1999 and between 2004 and
2005. Lee found that there was a spike above 0 in earnings changes between 1998 and 1999. He did not find
the same spike in earnings changes between 2004 and 2005. These findings led him to conclude that SOX did
constrain earnings management. This study improves on the previous study by examining earnings changes
for a longer period, and limits the sample to firms with data for the entire sample period. The current study
also examines the effect of Section 404 reporting on the internal control of earnings management.

1. Introduction
A wave of corporate governance failures in 2001 raised concerns about the
integrity of the accounting profession and the information provided to investors. It
was widely believed that companies extensively managed earnings in the period
leading up to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). In an influential speech,
former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt (1998) decried the loss of confidence in
financial statements due to various earnings management practices. He made
numerous recommendations to improve financial reporting, many of which were
incorporated into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
There were many issues that caused the failures. One of the causes was the
greed of executives at companies such as Enron and WorldCom. Another issue
was that auditors were not effectively limiting their clients’ discretion over
financial reporting. Finally, but definitely not the least important, cause was
ambiguities in accounting standards that allowed companies to manage earnings.
As a result, there was a drop in investor confidence.
The failures were highly publicized by the media and forced Congress to
pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which regulated the accounting industry and helped
“rebuild the faith of the investors” who depend on accountants for “information
that is critical to the capital market.”1 The changes in the law called for higher
standards and stiffer penalties. In fact, former President George W. Bush
commented at the time the act was implemented that the act was one of “the most
far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin D.
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Roosevelt.”2 Similarly, Barry Melancon, Chief Executive Officer and President of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, commented that SOX
“contains some of the most far-reaching changes that Congress has ever
introduced to the business world.”3
Regulations are effective only to the extent they are followed. Ultimately,
the quality of financial reporting depends on the integrity of managers and the
ability of auditors to say no. The auditor must have integrity. “No,” according to
Melancon, “means protecting the public interest by rejecting unsound corporate
accounting practices, reducing the risk of fraud and deceit, ensuring that the
financial statements are not just accurate but illuminating and questioning and
challenging management’s decision. When it is proper to do so, it means rejecting
management’s accounting decision.”4 In other words, saying “no” means saying
“yes” to protecting the interest of the public.
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has provided many drastic changes,
some of the consequences of the Act have yet to be studied. One of the areas
pertains to the limitation of earnings management. It is unclear whether the act
has actually limited earnings management by companies.
Therefore, the primary motivation for conducting this study is to
investigate whether or not the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been effective in reducing
earnings management. Public company earnings changes are examined for the
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period 1998 to 2006, to see if the incidence of small earnings increases was
reduced in the post-SOX period. The study is divided into two periods: the period
prior to the passage of the SOX (1997 through 2003) and the period after the
passage of SOX (2004 to 2006). The study did not find significant changes in
earnings management after SOX.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section,
section 2, provides background on earnings management. This is followed by
section 3, which gives the definition of earnings management and section 4,
which gives a description of measuring earnings management. Section 5 discusses
the role of auditors in constraining earnings management, and section 6 provides
additional details on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sections 7 and 8 present the idea
and objective of the study. Section 9 presents the research hypotheses. Section 10
discusses the data collection, and section 11 presents the results of the study. The
final section presents the study’s conclusions.

2. Background on Earnings Management
In David Burgstahler and Ilia Dichev’s 1997 research paper, they argued
that “firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decrease and losses.”5
That is, firms manipulate their earnings to make it seem as if their company is
improving every year. One of the purposes of earnings management is to meet or
exceed earnings benchmarks, such as analysts’ forecasts or prior year earnings.
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In their study, Burgstahler and Dichev found that among firms there was
disproportionate reporting of small earnings increases and decreases. They found
that there were few firms reporting small decreases in their earnings, but a large
number of firms reporting small increases in earnings.
There is a long history of firms attempting to prevent year-to-year
earnings decreases. The objective of increasing earnings from the previous year is
often stated in companies’ annual reports. For example, in Tenneco’s 1994 report,
the company’s CEO, Dana Mead, states: “I must emphasize that all of our
strategic actions are guided by and measured against this goal of delivering
consistently high increases in earnings over the long term.”6 This statement by
Mead indicates the pressure firms are faced with to increase earnings compared to
the previous year. If the firm does not have a positive yearly earnings change,
then it would not be fulfilling its objective to the company and stockholders. If
that does not happen, then the firm’s stock price may decline and the managers
might get fired. This provides the incentive to manage earnings. In fact, the firm
Eli Lilly, for many years, “emphasized a string of earnings increases which
reached 33 years before it was broken.”7 This portrays the importance of
increasing the firm’s earnings yearly and the pressure to do so.
Pressure to perform and meet earnings targets is not necessarily a bad
thing, but it leads one to question whether firms are using improper methods to
increase their earnings. In the Eli Lilly example, it seems unlikely that a company
could increase earnings for 33 consecutive years, as it seems likely there must be
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at least one year where the firm did not do as well. That is, there may be years
where earnings might decrease due to the external environment, such as a
recession. In another example, during its 1994 earnings release, former Bank of
America CEO, Richard Rosenberg, mentioned that “Increasing earnings per share
was our most important objective for the year.”8 This example further
demonstrates the importance of having positive earnings, and firms will often
make it their objective.
In a 1995 research, Mary Barth, John Elliot and Mark Finn, “Market
rewards associated with patterns of increasing earnings,” found that “a consistent
pattern of earnings increases commands higher price-to-earnings multiples.”9 That
is, an earnings increase results in a higher stock price. Also, in 1996, a study by
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo and Douglas Skinner, “Reversal of fortune:
Dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth,” found
that when a pattern of earning increases is broken, there is a “14% negative
abnormal stock return in the year the pattern is broken.”10 Basically, this indicates
that when firms do not have an increase in earnings from one year to the next,
their stock price is expected to drop. In other words, firms increase their yearly
earnings to avoid a decrease in their stock price.
A paper written by Hayn in 1995 best describes the situation:
Interestingly, there is a point of discontinuity around zero.
Specifically, there is a concentration of cases just above zero,
8
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while there are fewer than expected cases (assuming the above
normal distribution) of small losses i.e., just below zero). The
frequency of observations in both the region just above and that
just below zero departs significantly from the expected frequency
under the normal distribution at the 1% significance level using the
binomial test. These results suggest that firms whose earning are
expected to fall just below the zero earnings point engage in
earnings manipulation to help them cross the “red line” for the
year.11
While Burstahler and Dichev examine earnings changes, Hayn examines the level
of earnings, and examines whether companies attempt to avoid reporting losses.
In other words, Hayn analyzed the distribution of earnings and losses and saw a
trend where there are higher-than-expected results for earnings and lower-thanexpected results for losses. This suggests that companies manipulate their
earnings to avoid losses and to reflect earnings on the positive side of the
distribution.

3.1 Definition of Earnings and Earnings Management
Investopedia.com defines earnings as the “amount of profit that a
company produces during a specific period”; they have a direct relationship with
stock price. This is because the amount of earnings a company earns will
determine how successful the company might be in the near future. The earnings
of a company are looked at by analysts and investors to determine if a particular
stock is an attractive investment. Thus, a company with high earnings prospects
11
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will generally have a higher stock price than a company with poor earnings
prospects.
Healey and Wahlen (1999) provide an accurate definition of earnings
management. “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers.”12
In other words, earnings management can be committed when the
executives of a company change their financial statements to hide the actual
earnings. According to Katherine Schipper (1989) in Commentary on Earnings
Management, earnings management can be defined as “non-neutral financial
reporting in which managers intervene intentionally in the financial reporting
process to produce some private gain.”13 Further, Healy and Wahlen mention that
managers can intervene by “modifying how they interpret financial accounting
standards and accounting data, or by timing or structuring transactions.”14
In other words, income-increasing earnings management is a strategy used
by managers to change their earnings, usually to make it seem that earnings are
higher than they actually are. An example is a company trying to reach the
benchmark they forecast at the beginning of the year. Another situation could be
that consensus analyst forecasts predicted that a company would earn $65 million
12
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in 2008, but they earned only $63 million. In order to meet market expectations
and avoid a decline in their stock price, the company might increase their report
of earnings from $63 million to $65 million, using various accounting methods.

3.2 How Do Companies Manage Earnings?
There are many techniques that companies use to manage earnings. In his
1998 speech at the New York University Center for Law and Business, former
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, discussed
five popular techniques.
Levitt points out what he calls “Big Bath” restructuring charges. In order
to survive in a competitive environment, companies often have to “assess the
efficiency and profitability of their operations.”15 Thus, companies have to
restructure their business to survive against their competitors. Some restructuring
actions include closing stores or laying off workers. Big Bath charges are onetime charges taken by the company. General accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) require companies to estimate the cost of the restructuring in year one,
even though the expense might not occur until year two or three. The estimated
expense recognized will decrease the year’s earnings. If the company estimates
too much in year one, they can reverse it in year two and, thus, increase their
earnings for year two. A problem is presented because companies tend to
overstate these charges. The theory is “Wall Street will look beyond a one-time
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loss and focus only on future earnings.”16 Therefore, no matter the size of the loss,
if it is only for one time, Wall Street will not look at it. They will focus on the
company’s future earnings. That is why companies write down a larger expense
than usual to create a reserve for future losses.
The second issue Levitt discusses is called creative acquisition accounting,
or merger magic. In this creative accounting method, when a company acquires
another company, they have to write off the acquisition cost of the subsidiary as
“in-process Research and Development.”17 The acquisition cost must be written
off the year the asset is acquired. Thus, the parent company can write off as much
liability as they want for the acquisition, as a one time write-off. An example
would be when WorldCom once tried to write off their acquisition of MCI for $7
billion, but the Security and Exchange Commission did not allow it. So
WorldCom wound up writing off MCI for $3.2 billion under Research and
Development. This shows that a company can write off a huge amount of liability
through an acquisition and use it to boost their earnings later.
The third issue Levitt discusses is called Miscellaneous Cookie Jar
Reserves. Companies create the “cookie jar reserves” to allow them to beat the
Wall Street estimates, no matter how the company actually performs. They are
able to accomplish the goal by “using unrealistic assumptions to estimate
liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs.”18 By
doing this, they are able to hide their earnings when the company is doing well,
but when the company is doing badly, they can pull those earnings out of their
16
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reserves to cover up the loss. In other words, a company sets money aside when it
are doing well and uses the money when they are not doing well.
The fourth gimmick Levitt points out is the abuse of materiality.
Materiality in financial reporting means how significant an amount is to the
overall financial statements and how much it affects the required precision of
estimates. Auditors give leeway to a company in determining whether a
misstatement is material. Levitt argues that companies use this to their advantage
by misstating items to the maximum amount that is considered insignificant or not
immaterial. Even though those amounts are quantitatively immaterial, they may
still impact users’ decisions, as even a penny change in reported earnings per
share may impact stock prices.
The last issue Levitt brought up is that companies recognize revenue too
early. He mentions that companies recognize revenue “before a sale is complete,
before the product is delivered to the customer, or at a time when the customer
still has options to terminate, void or delay the sale.”19
The overall message of Levitt’s speech was that there was a problem with
financial reporting. He mentioned that the problem is that many companies create
earnings reports that reflect the earnings the company wants or needs to meet
Wall Street’s projections, instead of reporting the true underlying value of the
company.

3.3 Why Do Companies Manage Earnings?

19
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As identified by Levitt, sales and accounts receivable are the accounts
most often involved with earnings management. Beasley et al. (1999) found that
50 percent of financial statement frauds involving public companies over the
period 1987-1997 involved revenue recognition. Because of the prevalence of
these frauds, auditing standards specifically require that auditors identify a fraud
risk for revenue recognition, and the SEC has also issued revenue recognition
guidance in Staff Accounting Bulletin 99. Interestingly, revenue recognition was
not the central issue at Enron or WorldCom, the two major fraud cases leading up
to SOX, although several other major frauds of this time period did involve
revenue recognition.
An example of earnings management would be a publishing company that
is behind in their sales target at the end of the year. Earnings management would
be committed if the manager of the publishing company decides to meet their
forecast goal. The manager would then send out books to different bookstores,
even though these bookstores did not order and would not need the books until the
next year. The publisher then records the revenue upon shipping the books, and
this allows the company to meet its profit goals. One incentive managers is that
they get year-end bonuses for meeting their revenue or profit goals. In the case of
publicly traded companies, when they meet the benchmark for the year, their
stocks look more attractive to investors.
A great real life example is Happiness Express, Inc. This business was
started by Joseph Sutton and his brother Isaac. It involved identifying “trendy
characters introduced to children in the United States by television programs,

major movies, books and other publications.”20 Despite the company’s success,
there were doubts about whether the company could continue its success because
of children’s shifting tastes. Sutton predicted optimistic results for 2006, but it did
not work out as he had expected. In fact, the company booked phony sales and
receivables during 2005 and 2006 to meet its goals.
The drive behind committing earnings management is best stated by
Warren Buffet in a CNN article titled “Buffet on stocks, junk, ‘time bombs’”:
“Managers that always promise to ‘make the numbers’ will at some point be
tempted to make up the numbers.”21 This quote is saying that the pressure on
managers to meet goals forces them to try to meet them, and earnings
management is one of the methods. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
can fine corporations who commit this crime. However, there is not much
investors can do, because it is hard for them to pick it up when corporations do
commit the crime. When they find out, it is already too late. A good example
would be Enron.
Although it has been mentioned that companies often manage their
earnings by adding more sales to boost their revenue, it is worth noting that
trimming revenue is another way to manage earnings in the future. That is,
companies will cut their earnings to meet their target. For example, if a
company’s target earnings for the year were $72 million and they make $85
million at the end of the year, the company will try to find ways to reduce revenue
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to lower earnings, say, to $72 million. The explanation for this is it is better to
have a steady increase in earnings than a huge increase one year and a decrease
the next.

4. Measuring Earnings Management
It is difficult to detect earnings management. Because earnings
management is generally done through accounting accruals, one line of research
examines whether companies’ accruals deviate from expectations, using so-called
abnormal accruals models. Because earnings are usually managed to meet
objectives such as earnings targets, other studies use earnings benchmarks to
detect earnings management.
In a 2003 study, Mark Nelson, John Elliot and Robin Tarpley used a fieldbased questionnaire to ask auditors from one of the then Big 5 accounting firms to
identify techniques that their clients used to manage earnings. This study
was based on 515 experiences from 253 auditors, involving attempts by their
client to manage earnings. The study found that earnings management occurred in
key areas such as “revenue recognition, business combinations, intangibles, fixed
assets, investments and leases, and the most identified attempt was with
reserves.”22 The respondents believe that the managers’ attempts were motivated
by different incentives, such as to beat “analysts’ estimates to influence the stock
market, to reach targets sets by compensation contracts or debt covenants, to
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communicate economic information to stakeholders, and to smooth income or
improve future income as well as a combination of the incentives.”23
In Nelson, Elliot and Tarply’s they found “when transaction structuring is
involved, managers are more likely to attempt earnings management and (auditors
are less likely to adjust earnings management attempts), that are governed by
precise standards, and when transaction structuring is not involved, managers are
more likely to make attempts (and auditors are less likely to adjust attempts) that
are governed by imprecise rules.”24 The meaning behind the conclusion is that
managers make earnings management attempts and auditors have to figure out
whether the attempts are significant enough to require an adjustment. In order to
combat this, managers change the amounts and methods they use to achieve
earnings management, so that auditors will not require them to adjust. Otherwise,
the auditors will not give them an unqualified opinion on their financial
statements. Thus, the conclusion is that auditors are unlikely to require a company
to adjust its financial statements if the company follows structured transaction
rules when the standards are precise, or if the managers follow unstructured
transaction rules when the standards are imprecise.
To explain further, transaction structuring occurs when managers structure
transactions to meet certain objectives. One example would be a manager
structuring transactions by timing events. That is, managers can “recognize
accumulated unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities in a particular
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accounting period by selling the securities as required by SFAS NO. 115.”25 It is
important to note that transaction structuring requires a transaction fee, a fee paid
to experts for their advice and for the “modification of operational decisions that
presumably were optimized prior to the structuring.”26 Thus, managers use
transaction structuring only when the “anticipated financial reporting benefits
exceed its anticipated out-of-pocket and operational costs.”27
Nelson also found that “managers are more likely to make attempts that
increase current-year income but auditors are more likely to require that those
attempts be adjusted, that managers are more likely to make attempts that
decrease current-year income with unstructured transactions and when standards
are imprecise, and that auditors are more likely to require adjustment of attempts
that they identify as material or that are attempted by small clients.”28 In other
words, auditors are more likely to make managers adjust their financial statements
(1) when they increase their income when the standards are precise, or they
decrease their income when the standards are imprecise, (2) increases or decreases
are material or (3) when a small company increases or decreases its income.
Cohen, Dey and Lys found that accrual-based earnings management
increased steadily from 1987 to the period before the passage Sarbanes-Oxley act
and decreased significantly after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley. On the other
hand, they found during the same period that real earnings management activities
decreased prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and increased
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significantly after. The significance of the finding is that it suggests firms
switched from accrual-based earnings management activities to real earnings
management activities after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Accrualbased earnings management occurs when firms use accounting methods and
decisions to alter reported earnings. Real earnings management involves using
operating decisions to manage earnings. Real earnings management is used
because it is harder to detect. However, real earnings is more costly to use. There
are multiple ways to commit real earnings management; Cohen, Dey and Lys
describe three: The first is accelerating the timing of sales by offering huge price
discounts or offering more lenient credit terms. The only problem is that sales will
decrease in the future once the discount is removed. The second method is
lowering the cost of goods sold by increasing production. The problem is that the
company has more inventory and “other production and holding costs will lead to
higher annual production costs relative to sales and lower cash flows from
operations given sales levels.”29 The third method is to decrease discretionary
expenses, such as advertising, or research and development.

5. Big Six Auditors Limit Earnings Management
Jerry Francis, Edward Maydew and Charles Sparks, in “The role of Big 6
auditors in the credible reporting of accruals,” look at whether firms that generate
high accruals are more likely to use Big 6 auditors. A likely reason a firm with
high accruals might hire a Big Six auditor is that a Big Six auditor provides higher
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assurance. They looked at a large sample of NASDAQ firms from 1975 to 1994
and found that Big Six auditors have higher total accruals but lower estimated
discretionary accruals. They concluded that Big Six auditors “constrain aggressive
and potentially opportunistic reporting.”30
In 2002, when studying a sample of Initial Public Offering firms, Jian
Zhou and Randal Elder found that specialist auditors constrain earnings
management. In another study, they aimed to address a similar issue, but this time
looked at firms using seasoned equity offerings. They investigated the
“relationship between audit quality as measured by audit firm size and industry
specialization, and earnings management as measured by discretionary current
accruals.” A seasoned equity offering (SEO) is an equity offering by an existing
publicly-traded firm. The advantage of using SEO companies is that the firms
would want to engage in income earnings management to ensure the success of
their SEO. The main research question Zhou and Elder’s study aimed to address is
how Big 5 and industry specialist auditors constrain earnings management in the
SEO setting. Zhou and Elder found that SEO firms that use Big 5 auditors have
lower earnings management in the years before, during and after the SEO. They
also found that industry specialists are associated with lower earnings
management only during the year of the SEO. Zhou and Elder’s findings
contribute to the accounting literature by proving that audit quality and industry
specialization reduces or limits earnings management.
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6. The Sarbanes Oxley-Act
Before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the accounting industry
followed a self-regulation model. In the late 1990s, accountants and corporate
executives took advantage of their freedom and engaged in earnings management.
As a result, top executives made millions. Later on, when these actions were
revealed, many investors lost money, and in some cases, such as that of Enron,
employees lost their jobs and retirement funds.
There were two waves of accounting fraud scandals. The first wave
involved Enron/Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing and Imclone in late 2001. The
second wave included WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco in the summer of 2002.
The second wave caused Congress to act quickly. This is because, after the first
wave of scandals, Congress was not sure what to do. However, after the second
wave of scandals, they quickly decided the Act must be passed. It was drafted by
Democrat Paul Sarbanes and Republican Michael Oxley. When the Act was
signed into law on July 30, 2002, the business world was faced with stricter rules.
The goal of the Act was to stop the misreporting of financial information by firms
and to restore the confidence of investors after they had lost thousands of dollars
when the firms went bankrupt.
Excerpts from the Sarbanes Oxley Act:
 Section 101: Creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB).
The establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board was to address the problem with the accounting industry’s self-

regulation model. The goal of the PCAOB was to make sure auditors were
following the rules and doing their job right. During the 1990s, many
accounting firms were more interested in selling their consulting services.
In fact, their consulting services were generating more revenue than their
audit services. Thus, auditors’ independence was jeopardized because
audit services are suppose to be the primary service offered by the
accounting firm, the revenue driver. In this situation, audit services were
not the revenue driver; thus, many failed to do their job in audits, which is
to protect the public.
The PCAOB limits earnings management by making sure auditors
are doing the best job possible to detect earning management.

 Section 202: Company has to have an independent board of directors to
supervise auditors.
Prior to the passage of the Act, the client had control over the
auditor because the client was paying the auditor’s fee. More importantly,
the CEO and CFO had the right to fire the auditor at any point. Thus, the
auditor’s independence could be compromised because if they did not do
what management told them to do, they could be fired. An independent
board and audit committee help to keep auditors independent of the firm.
The addition of an independent audit committee limits earnings
management by making auditors more willing to tell their clients there is
something wrong with their financial statements, without the risk of being
fired.

 Section 302: The CEO and CFO must certify that they have reviewed the
quarterly and annual reports before the company sends them to the SEC.
Prior to SOX, companies often produced financial statements that
were not accurate. They then forced auditors to sign-off on them. When
the companies got into trouble, the CEOs did not take responsibility for it.
The addition of this section forces CEOs and CFOs to make sure that they
review the quarterly and annual financials and ascertain that they are as
accurate as possible.
The certification of the financial statements by CEOs and CFOs
ensures that the financial statements are most likely accurate. This is
because, if they are not, and the CEOs and CFOs sign off on them, they
will be held responsible.

 Section 404: Include Internal Control Report in annual report. CEO and
CFO have to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls and report
weaknesses.
Section 404 complements Section 302. Section 404 states that the
CEO and CFO must establish and maintain adequate internal controls, so
that accurate financial statements can be produced.
The section limits earnings management by ensuring that CEOs
and CFOs are doing everything they possibly can to ensure that the
financial statements are put together in the right way.

7. The Idea for this Study
There have been many articles written about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act since
its passage. Many of the recent articles have focused on different sections of the
Act. One of the topics that is relevant, but is not talked a lot about in the literature,
is how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has influenced how earnings are reported. The
topic is worth exploring because one of the main reasons the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was passed was due to the misreporting of earnings. Accordingly, examining
earnings management before and after the Act will provide evidence on whether
or not the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been effective in reducing earnings
management. Though there are articles written about this topic, none has
compared earnings management before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
passed. That is the question I aim to address in this study.
My advisor and I chose this topic to research. We based our study on a
journal article written by Dichev and Burgstahler fifteen years ago. Our
hypothesis is that, if there is reduced earnings management in the wake of SOX,
then the earnings of all firms should closely resemble a perfect bell curve. In the
case presented by Dichev and Burgstahler, the bell curve is shifted to the right,
due to the greater-than-expected number of small earnings increases.

The graph shows a total 64,466 observations between 1977 and 1994. The
observations in each year are between 33,000 and 4,000 in number.
number One important
fact to know about tthe observation is that the mean and median changes each year
were positive.
The spike in the curve just past zero earnings changes is strong evidence
that companies manage earnings to exceed the prior year level of earnings. Absent
earnings management, we would not expect discontinuity in the distribution. So
we believe that Sarbanes
Sarbanes-Oxley,
Oxley, if it has been effective, would reduce the number
of small positive earnings changes.

8. The Objective of this Study

The objective in this study is to compare the earnings of firms prior to and
posterior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The specific section of the
Act the study will focus on is Section 404. This section asks the CEO and CFO to
evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls and report weaknesses. Internal
controls are methods put in place to ensure that financial and accounting
information meet operational targets and to transmit management policies
throughout the organization. The two types of firms examined in the study are
firms compliant with Section 404 (firms with market capitalization of over 75
million dollars) and the non-404-compliant firms. The years studied are 1997 to
2006. By doing this study and analyzing the results, I hoped to find out if the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an effect on earnings management.

9. Hypotheses
The main independent variable in this study is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. My
dependent variable for this study is changes in reported earnings.

Hypothesis 1: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects earnings management.
The post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act distribution of earnings changes will be
different from the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act distribution of earnings
changes.
Hypothesis 2: Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects earnings
management
The post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act distribution of earnings changes will be
different for Section 404 firms than for non-Section 404 firms.

10. Data Collection
1. Received data from research advisor Randal Elder on the basic earnings
per share (EPS) of non-financial institutions, companies that are not
holding companies or fund companies, and companies that have EPS for
the years 1997-2006.
2. The data received had to be cleaned and modified.
3. The key piece of information in this data is earnings per share (basic).
4. I first had to delete holdings and funds and financial institutions because
those entities are not part of the study.
5. Next, I deleted firms that did not have earnings per share for the years
1997 to 2006.
6. Next, the change in earnings per share from one year to the next was
calculated.
7. Finally, the data were sorted by year and earnings changes per year.
8. My final data had 25, 631 observations for 2,563 companies. The
observations for the reported earnings are for the years 1997-2006
9. The earnings changes measured were from 1998-2006 because the data
were not available for 1996. Therefore, the earnings changes in 1997
could not be calculated.
10. A histogram was plotted based on the findings.

11. My Results
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The 1998-2003 graph shows the frequency of earnings changes in companies
from -0.01 to 0.01 in the years 1998 to 2003. In the graph, it appears that there is
no spike at 0.01. Thus, from the graph, one cannot conclude that earnings
management is occurring. In order to find more conclusive evidence, the graph is
expanded.

1998-2003 Expanded
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The expanded 1998-2003 graph shows earnings changes from -0.05 to 0.05.
Although there are a smaller number of positive changes of .01, there does appear
to be a spike at 0.02. This is somewhat consistent with the findings in Burgstahler
and Dichev that companies manage earnings to register small earnings increases.

2004-2006
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The 2004-2006 graph shows the frequency of earnings changes from -0.01. to
0.01. This graph is an example of a histogram where earnings management has
not occurred. If our hypothesis is true and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has limited
earnings management, then there should be no spike around 0, as can be seen.
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Consistent with my observations for the years 1998-2003, a histogram with
earnings changes of -0.05 to 0.05 was observed. Again, consistent with the results
of the previous graph, this graph does not provide evidence of earnings
management.

1998-2006 Table of Earnings Changes

In order to better analyze the results, a comparison by percentage for
specific earnings changes was done. The number of observations in each cell
cannot be compared because the amount of data used in 1998-2003 was greater
than 2004-2006. Based on an analysis of the percentages, it appears that the
percentage for each earnings change, pre-SOX and post-SOX, is fairly similar.
Thus, the data do not provide evidence that SOX limited earnings management.

2004-2006: Companies who comply with SOX Section 404
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To analyze the results further, only the earnings changes of companies that
comply with SOX Section 404 were graphed; that is, companies which have a
market capitalization of over $75 million were included. The results provide some
evidence of limits on small positive earnings changes, although there is also a
spike at 0.05.

12. Summary and Conclusion
After sorting the data, plotting the graphs and tables, and analyzing the
results, the conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no significant change in
the distribution of earnings pre- and post-SOX. One possibility is that SOX has
not affected the ability of a company to manage earnings. Another possibility
could be that earnings management existed pre-SOX, but was not widespread
among companies, despite evidence from Burgstahler and Dichev. My pre-SOX
data came from after the period studied by Burgstahler and Dichev and failed to
replicate their finding of earnings management. One possibility could be that rules
such as SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 - Materiality and stronger audit
committees were already effective in limiting earnings management prior to
passage of the Act.
Another possibility is that companies may have substituted real earnings
management, as described by Cohen, Dey and Lys, for accounting earnings
management. Auditors are expected to be responsible for accounting for earnings
management, but are not generally held responsible for real earnings management
that reflects operating decisions. If companies have increased their use of real
earnings management, the distribution of earnings changes may be unaffected by
the Act.
Although this study does not find that SOX limited earnings management,
additional analyses using more precise or alternative measures may find evidence
of changes in earnings management. Finally, since the Act was designed to restore

investor confidence, perceptions of changes in financial reporting may be more
important than actual changes in reported earnings.
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Written Capstone Summary
The purpose of this study is to investigate how effective the SarbanesOxley Act is in limiting companies from managing their earnings. Based on the
regulations included in the Act, one would conclude that without a doubt, the Act
had an impact on earnings management. However, this study failed to find
changes in earnings management after the Act.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in July 2002 after the failure of
companies like Enron and WorldCom. It was passed mainly due to pressure by
the media after the fall of WorldCom. The purpose of the Act was to regulate the
accounting industry and rebuild the trust of the investors. Some of the important
sections of the act that could pertain to limiting earnings management are the
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the increased
qualifications and independence of the audit committee, and the requirement for
managers to certify that financial statements are accurate. All of those sections are
included to ensure that auditors are independent and take responsibility when they
sign off on financial statements.
The definition of earnings management is the practice of managers
changing the financial reports of a company to make it seem like the company is
doing better than it actually is. The past history of firms shows that consistent
increases in earnings is good for a company and that a decline in earnings has a
significant negative effect on the stock price of the company. Thus, earnings
management can be done by overstating or understating the company’s income, to
make sure there is a steady increase in a company’s earnings year after year.

The study had two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that there will be
decreased earnings management due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and that this can
be determined by comparing earnings changes before and after the passage of the
Act. The second hypothesis is that Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will
limit earnings management for firms that comply with Section 404. The data
collected included over 25,000 observations for 2,500 companies. Public
companies earnings changes were examined for the period 1998 to 2006 to see if
the incidence of small earnings increases was reduced in the post-SOX period.
The year 1997 was not included because earnings figures for 1996 were not
provided, so that the earnings change for 1997 could not be calculated. The first
study was divided into two periods: the period prior to the passage of SOX (1997
through 2003) and the period after the passage of SOX (2004 to 2006). The
second study examined earnings changes in companies that comply with SOX
Section 404, with market capitalization over $75 million.
The results were analyzed by comparing graphs and tables. For the graph
of years 1998-2003, there was no spike in the range -0.01 to 0.01, but there was a
spike at 0.02 when the range was expanded to -0.05 to 0.05. For graph of years
2004-2006, the changes in the range of earnings from -0.01 to 0.01 and -0.05 to
0.05 did not provide evidence of earnings management. To further analyze these
results, the data were compiled into a table, and the changes in the percentages for
earnings in the range -0.05 to 0.05 were compared. I did not compare the amounts
because there was more data for the years 1998 to 2003 than 2004 to 2006. The
results from the table comparison showed no change pre-SOX compared to post-

SOX. Next, only companies with a market capitalization of over $75 million
were plotted into a histogram. This is because only companies with a market
capitalization of over $75 million have to comply with SOX Section 404. The
results provide some evidence of limits on small positive earnings changes,
although there is also a spike at 0.05.
The conclusion of the study is that there is no significant change in
earnings reported post-SOX as compared to pre-SOX. This could be due to the
fact that laws were already in place before the passage of the SOX, or to the fact
that earnings management is not as widespread as the media have made it out to
be.

